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YALE KAMISAR'S CREATION

It is no exaggeration to say that Yale Kamisar was present at the
creation of Miranda v. A rizona.1 To be sure, the seeds of Miranda had
been sown in earlier cases, particularly Escob edo v. Ill inois,2 but
Escob edo was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel case. Professor
Kamisar first saw the potential for extending the theory of Escob edo
to the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
Escob edo theorized that a healthy criminal justice system requires that
the accused know their rights and are encouraged to exercise them.
The Escob edo Court read history to teach
that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through
unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving
should have to fe ar that if an accused is permitted to consult with a
lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system
of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that
system.3

Justice White, dissenting in Escob edo, read the Court's opinion to
demonstrate concern about "the unknowing defendant who responds
to police questioning because he mistakenly believes that he must and
that his admissions will not be used against him."4 The majority's
intuition that information about rights is critical to a fair interrogation
process is a powerful one. But the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was an odd place to attach that intuition to the Constitution. The right
to counsel had never been thought to apply to police interrogation
before, and Escob edo was but a baby step in that direction. The
Escob edo Court required counsel when
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent.5

But few suspects would benefit from a right defined that narrowly.
Few suspects have lawyers and only some of them request a lawyer in

1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. Id. at 490 (footnotes omitted).
4. Id. at 499 (White, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 490-91.
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the face of police interrogation. If information is power, a broader
basis for requiring it had to be found.
As Kamisar recognized in 1965, and the Court the next year,
informational concerns in the interrogation context are more
appropriately centered on the right not to be compelled to incriminate
oneself. The criminal justice system makes much of the privilege not
to testify in court and other judicial proceedings, requiring a formal
waiver. The courtroom right is not very valuable, of course, if the
accused has already confessed in the interrogation room. Kamisar put
it this way:
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow and
strut and prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But what
happens before an accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of
this veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub. Typically he must first pass
through a much less pretentious edifice, a police station with bare back
rooms and locked doors.6

As everyone knows who has watched television in the last thirty
five years, Miranda sought to level the playing field by giving suspects
at least formal control over the interrogation. Miranda required that
all suspects who are subjected to custodial interrogation be given two
critical pieces of information - that the suspect has a right to remain
silent and a right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation.
The Court assumed that suspects who felt incapable of dealing with
police would invoke the right to silence or to counsel. And it seems
clear that the Court (the majority and the dissents) expected lots of
suspects to do just that, making interrogation a much smaller part of
the American police station procedure than it had become by the mid
1 960s.7
Now we are closing in on Miranda's fortieth birthday. The
available, albeit somewhat sketchy, evidence suggests that the police
have adapted very well to the Miranda regime. Moreover, the B urger
and Rehnquist Courts have failed to apply the Miranda informational
theory with much enthusiasm, creating several avenues for prosecutors
to use statements made without warnings or based upon what the
Warren Court would have considered questionable waivers.8
6. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . ., in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME, 1, 19 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) [hereinafter Kamisar, Equal Justice].
7. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (concluding that "[i]n order to
combat these [interrogation] pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised
of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored"); id. at 541 (White, J.,
dissenting) (charging that the majority's rule "is a deliberate calculus to prevent
interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty and to increase the
number of trials").
8. See infra Part IV.
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Together, these cases potentially undermine the Miranda protections
or at least "lessen the desirable clarity" of the doctrine.9
In honor of Yale Kamisar, I seek in this paper to shed light on
three sets of questions. The first set concerns police compliance with
Miranda. Do they give warnings when the rules say they should, do
they honor invocations of the right to remain silent or to have counsel
present, and do they secure waivers of the Miranda rights in ways that
courts accept? Judges tell us that, at least as a formal matter, police
comply quite routinely with Miranda's warning and waiver
requirements. A related set of questions is whether, having secured a
waiver, police use coercion and trickery to obtain confessions. The
evidence here is murkier though overt coercion and elaborate trickery
seem relatively rare. The third set of questions, which has never been
the subject of an empirical study, concerns how prosecutors use the
various Miranda loopholes to get statements admitted that might be
inadmissible under a robust interpretation of Miranda. The ironic
answer here is that the "loopholes" prosecutors use most often to
admit statements taken without warnings or waiver are built into the
Miranda doctrine itself and are not the result of later courts tinkering
with the Miranda rules.
II.

MY STUDY

I sought answers in the stories that prosecutors and defendants tell
in court about interrogation. One admittedly imperfect source of those
stories are court opinions drawn from one of the web-based legal
services (I used Westlaw). To be sure, listening to suspect stories in a
sample of (mostly) appellate cases - 198 of the 211 cases, or 94%,
arose on appeal or in habeas10 - has a set of potentially distorting
limitations. Police have an incentive to tell a story that emphasizes
compliance with Miranda and the voluntariness of the defendant's
responses, while defendants have an even stronger incentive to
emphasize precisely the opposite aspects of the interrogation.
Moreover, since very few cases go to trial and fewer still are appealed,
the pool of appellate cases is unlikely to be a representative sample.
More than 90% of convictions result from guilty pleas,11 and guilty
pleas waive any objection to the admission of a confession.12 The
stronger the argument for suppression, all else equal, the less likely a
defendant is to plead guilty and waive the argument. Thus, it seems
9. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984).
10. Ten federal district court cases appeared in my sample along with three Delaware
superior (trial) court cases.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2000, at
426 (2001) (federal data for 1999); id. at 457 (state data for 1999).
12. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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likely that the pool of convictions on appeal will contain stronger
arguments for suppression than the 90% of all convictions that result
from guilty pleas.13
A more troublesome distorting effect in my study is the series of
"filters" that distort the reality of what happened in the interrogation
room. The suspect's story is filtered through his lawyer. The police
story is filtered through the prosecutor. The lawyers' arguments
presumably appear verbatim in the transcript of the hearing on the
motion to suppress but are inevitably filtered as they make their way
to the court where the issues are ultimately resolved. My study
uncovered one case in which the latter filter seems particularly
distorting.14
But I believe examining a sample of cases from Westlaw is useful.
These data suggest several truths about interrogation. On a more
rigorous note, the data permit a test of five hypotheses drawn from
two studies: one by Richard Leo15 and one by Paul Cassell and Bret
Hayman.16 First, police almost always give Miranda warnings as
required by the Miranda Court's own set of rules. Second, suspects
overwhelmingly waive their rights. Third, police usually cease
questioning when the suspect invokes the right to silence or to
counsel. Fourth, police rarely use overtly coercive tactics to get
waivers. Fifth, police rarely use overtly coercive tactics to obtain
confessions following waiver. If my study, using a different
methodology, confirms any of these hypotheses, that would suggest

13. I ignore in the text two categories of cases: acquittals and dismissals. It is of course
possible that a successful motion to suppress a confession will lead to an acquittal or
dismissal. Presumably these successful motions will contain strong evidence of police
coercion and failure to follow Miranda. But Peter Nardulli's study of 7767 cases found a
successful motion to suppress a confession in only 0.16% of cases. Peter J. Nardulli, The
Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: A n Empirical Reassessment, 1983 AM. B . FOUND.
RES. J. 585, 594-96 (1983) (finding that 2.5% of motions to suppress confessions were
successful and motions to suppress were made in only 7.6% of cases). For purposes of
describing routine police behavior, we can safely ignore the behavior that might be
demonstrated in 0.16% of all cases.
Of course, cases can be dismissed prior to a motion to suppress. These dismissals will not
appear in Nardulli's data. Richard Leo pointed out that cases with blatant Miranda
violations might be dismissed very early in the process. Email from Richard Leo, Oct. 28,
2003 (on file with Michigan Law Review). But my intuition, given the various ways that
police and prosecutor can seek to bring the police methods in line with Miranda, is that
prosecutors seek to use almost all incriminating statements and take their chances at a
suppression hearing. If dismissals prior to the suppression stage are as rare as I suspect, very
few Miranda violations are thus hidden from view).
14. See the case of Juan Carlos Chavez, infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
15. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside].
16. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects a/Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).
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that whatever the limitations of the earlier studies, they are reflecting
something close to the reality of police interrogation on these points.17
To conclude that there is general compliance with Miranda and
little evidence of overt coercion, even if true, is not to say that police
never break the rules about interrogation. Presumably, some police
are capable of intentionally violating the rules about interrogation.
And one assumes police would be most likely to violate rules about
interrogation when they perceive they most need a confession where the crime is horrendous, the police believe they have the guilty
party, and the investigation has turned up little evidence. My random
sample contained one case like this.18 If there is one such case in every
211 cases, that would be cause for concern. These cases are precisely
the ones where the system is most at risk of convicting an innocent
person.19 The evidence might be thin because the suspect is innocent,
and the police might be wrong in their belief that they have the right
person. Given sufficient trickery and coercion, an innocent person
could make damaging statements and wind up being convicted on
circumstantial evidence. So one troubling question left unanswered by
any study to date is whether Miranda provides sufficient protection
against raw coercion in these hopefully rare cases.20
III.

GETIING INFORMATION ABOUT INTERROGATION

What role does Miranda play in twenty-first century police
interrogation? Perhaps police fail to give the Miranda warnings and
then later falsely claim that they gave the warnings. Perhaps police
give the warnings but lie when they later claim the suspect waived his
rights without pressure, trickery, or coercion. Alternatively, perhaps
police follow the rules and simply benefit from the apparent urge of
many suspects to answer police questions. 2 1
One universe of possibilities can be seen in David Simon's book,
Homicide.22 After spending a year observing one shift of Baltimore
homicide detectives, Simon put together a composite interrogation

17. All three studies could suffer similar limitations. But as Parts III and V make plain,
the methodologies are radically different.
18. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
19. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 271-82 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas III eds., 1998).
20. One scholar contends that Miranda is positively harmful. See Alfredo Garcia, ls
Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or ls It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (2000).
21. For some thoughts on stories in the interrogation room, see George C. Thomas III,
Miranda's Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1091
(2003), reviewing WELSH s. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS (2001).
22. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991).
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that sought to reflect reality. In this interrogation, the police are sure
they have the right suspect, but their case is thin, and so they engage in
a lengthy series of ruses to persuade the suspect to talk to them. The
basic thrust of the scheme is to convince the suspect that he is better
off talking to the police than facing a "tie-wearing, three-piece
bloodsucker - a no-nonsense prosecutor from the Violent Crimes
Unit."23
To push the suspect toward waiving his Miranda rights, the police
lie about the strength of their case. The interrogator claims to have
three eyewitnesses, blood spatter on the suspect's shoes, and latent
prints on the handle of the murder weapon. To clinch the deal, the
detective offers the suspect what appears to be an excuse for the
killing: "He came at you, right? You were scared. It was self
defense."24 The suspect admits that the victim came at him, and the
police at this point secure a written waiver of Miranda and proceed to
get the suspect's story admitting that he killed the victim. Simon notes
that "if that police detective wasn't so busy committing [the suspect's]
weak bullshit to paper," he might even tell him
that the other witnesses in the other rooms are too drunk to identify their
own reflections, much less the kid who had the knife, or that it's always a
long shot for the lab to pull a latent off a knife hilt, or that [his] $95
sneakers are as clean as the day [he] bought them.25

An alternate universe imagines that police routinely provide
Miranda warnings in a straightforward manner and obtain waivers
without putting much pressure on suspects. In Richard Leo's
pioneering study, he observed 182 interrogations. His study suggests
that the Miranda waiver process is routine. Leo found that the
detectives provided warnings every time the suspect was in custody
and was about to be interrogated. Indeed, Leo noted that, with two
exceptions, the detectives read the warnings verbatim from a printed
form.26 Leo did not note any trickery or coercion used in obtaining
waivers, and he found that 78% of suspects waived their Miranda
rights.27
On the cognate question of how police proceed following a waiver,
Leo's universe of cases begins to resemble the David Simon universe.
Though the interrogations tended to be fairly short - 70% of the
interrogations lasted less than an hour and only 8% lasted more than
two hours28 - Leo observed a wide variety of techniques designed to
23. Id. at 195.
24. Id. at 196.
25. Id.
26. See Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 275-76.
27. Id. at 276 tbl. 3.
28. Id. at 279.
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encourage the suspect to confess. He grouped these techniques into
negative and positive incentives. Negative incentives are "tactics that
suggest the suspect should confess because of no other plausible
course of action," while positive incentives are "tactics that suggest the
suspect will in some way feel better or benefit if he confesses."29 The
most common incentive Leo observed was the one that took center
stage in the Simon universe, a mix of positive and negative incentives:
"In approximately 90% of the interrogations [Leo] observed, the
detective confronted the suspect with evidence (whether true or false)
of his guilt and then suggested that the suspect's self-interest would be
advanced if he confessed. "30 As to overt coercion that might rise to the
level of a due process violation, however, Leo found it in only 2% of
the interrogations he observed.31
In a study conducted by Paul Cassell and Bret Hayman,
researchers were able to observe screening sessions where prosecutors
questioned police officers about the evidence they had obtained. The
Cassell-Hayman findings confirmed Leo's on the issue of Miranda
compliance. They report no failures to warn suspects who were in
custody. Suspects waived Miranda in large numbers
84% in this
sample.32 No evidence appears of coercive tactics to obtain a waiver. In
the Cassell-Hayman study, police reported that they always stopped
questioning when the suspect invoked Miranda.33
As with all efforts to get "inside the interrogation room," both of
these studies have limitations. The Cassell-Hayman study depends on
the accuracy with which police reported to the prosecutor about
whether they gave warnings and how they obtained waivers. One does
not have to be unduly cynical to assume that police put the best light
on their interrogation methods when discussing the case with the
prosecutor. After all, most of the cases will be plea bargained before
any motion to suppress, and any coercion or tricks will never see the
light of day. The Leo study suffers from the observational effect.
Perhaps police save their "dirty tricks" for times when academics are
not in the room! Leo discusses this effect and concludes that it did not
"significantly alter[] the behavior of the detectives."34
-

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 282-83.
32. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 859 tbl. 3.
33. Id. at 861. Cassell and Hayman reported on the success or failure of the police
interrogations in some detail but made no effort to assess the techniques used to obtain the
statements. Id.
34. Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 270. It seems likely that when police use overt coercion
to obtain a confession, they do so only after weighing the pros and cons and making a
conscious decision. But that decisionmaking process during the Leo study would include the
fact that a Ph.D. student was going to be sitting in the room. Presumably, Leo's presence
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Both studies suffer two other limitations. The obvious one is
geographical. Leo's study was limited to the San Francisco Bay Area.
The Cassell-Hayman study was limited to Salt Lake County, Utah. We
cannot foreclose the possibility that San Francisco or Salt Lake police
are more (or less) professional than those in most of the rest of the
country. Indeed, the question is more complex than a simple reference
to professionalism. It entails the interrogators' attitudes, values, and
beliefs about crime, about criminals, and about the importance of
following rules, as well as external facts about the police command
structure and the particular political context in which police operate.
The second limitation bears on the issue of how often suspects
make incriminating statements during interrogation. To get this
number, both studies depend on a characterization of the answers
given by suspects. Such characterization can be a maddeningly difficult
task. Few real suspects confess to police the way fictional suspects
confess to Lieutenant Columbo. Most answers to police questions are
intended to be exculpatory (as indeed, Columbo's prey intend until
the very end). Many answers will ultimately incriminate but that is
often not known for sure until one knows how the State uses or
intends to use the evidence. Leo controlled for this problem by using
the police viewpoint; he counted as "incriminating" those statements
that the police considered incriminating.35 Cassell and Hayman created
a more complex characterization system, but as they candidly admit, it
is difficult to draw a line between an incriminating statement and one
that denies the suspect's role in the crime but at the same time
connects the suspect to the crime scene or calls into question his
truthfulness.36
As noted earlier, my study suffers from the way facts are "filtered"
through the process of preserving them in a motion to suppress and
then appealing that decision. But whatever limitations these filters
create, my study does avoid two of the problems of the Leo and
Cassell-Hayman studies. First, my national sample obviously avoids
the geographical problem. It also avoids the characterization difficulty.
The information about Miranda compliance in these cases comes from
the hearing on the motion to suppress. Filing a motion to suppress is
the clearest indication that the defense views the statements as
incriminating. A final benefit of my study is that it permits a rigorous
examination of the way prosecutors use the Court's doctrine to seek
admission of statements.

would tilt the balance toward not using coercion. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility
that Leo's presence produced the "no coercion" result, a possibility that Leo has never
denied. See, e.g., Leo email, supra note 13.
35. Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 280.
36. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 864-65.
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THE PROBLEM WITH THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE

Reported cases will contain the stories that prosecutors tell about
police compliance with the Miranda doctrine. These stories should
disclose the extent to which the Court's "easing" of the Miranda rules
over the past three decades has undermined Miranda's protections
and made it easier for prosecutors to "sell" the Miranda compliance
story to courts. In New York v. Quarles,37 the Court created an
exception to Miranda that permits police to ask questions without
giving warnings when the situation poses a threat to public safety.
How broadly prosecutors and trial courts understand "public safety" is
unknown. But Quarles will show up in my study because prosecutors
must persuade the suppression judge and the appellate courts that the
police were acting to protect public safety. A tabulation of the stories
that prosecutors tell provides a window into how Quarles has affected
the admission of statements.
Oregon v. Elstad38 held that a confession is admissible if police give
warnings and secure a waiver after the suspect has previously made a
statement that is inadmissible under Miranda. Police who wish to
avoid Miranda's strictures can interrogate without giving warnings and
then warn the suspect, who will likely figure the "cat is out of the bag"
and confess again.39 Some of the "cat out of the bag" cases might not
show up in the cases because the second confession is, on its face,
admissible and defense counsel might have chosen not to make an
argument that seemed to be foreclosed by Elstad. 40 Some of these
cases might surface, however, when courts recount the facts of a case.
My study is not limited to issues that defendants press at the motion to
suppress. Indeed, the facts in fifteen cases disclosed that the Miranda
warnings were given even though the suspect remained silent and
there was, of course, no Miranda suppression hearing.
Even less likely to show up in my study is the full effect of the
Court's impeachment doctrine. Only four years after Miranda, the
Court in Harris v. New York41 held that a statement taken in violation
of Miranda was admissible to impeach the defendant's testimony at
37. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
38. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
39. The officer who follows this strategy must now take account of Missouri v. Seibert,
- U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004), where five justices condemned the intentional failure to
provide warnings in the hopes that the suspect would repeat the confession after warnings
are given later. Though the plurality opinion casts a broader net than the intentional failure
to warn, Justice Kennedy, the critical fifth vote, concurred in the judgment only. Kennedy
would find this practice unconstitutional only when part of a deliberate strategy to avoid
Miranda.
40. Given Seibert, supra note 39, no competent lawyer today would fail to move to
suppress in this situation, but Seibert was decided after my study ended.
41. 401 U.S. 222 ( 1970).
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trial. It is unlikely that a jury can forget the defendant's confession
when considering his guilt, and the effect of Harris is almost certainly
to deter defendants from taking the witness stand when the prosecutor
can offer a statement to impeach his credibility. Thus, it will be
impossible to assess the true cost of Harris since the cases of deterred
defendants will not show up in the database as Harris cases, though
one might see an occasional case where the defendant decides his trial
testimony will be a net benefit.
In addition to these explicit modifications, the Court has reshaped
the Miranda doctrine in more subtle ways that simply cannot be
measured by reading case reports. Miranda said that the State bore a
"heavy burden" of demonstrating waiver in cases where the suspect
answers police questions without a lawyer present.42 This could have
developed into some sort of presumption against finding waiver, but
the Court quickly retreated to the position that waivers need only be
voluntary to be valid. Indeed, the Court seems to require only that the
suspect indicate knowledge of his rights and then answer questions.43
And it does not matter if the suspect indicates willingness to answer in
a way that suggests he doesn't really understand the warnings. For
example, the Court has held that waiver can be found even if the
suspect refuses to sign a written waiver.44
Davis v. United States45 expanded the notion that police can accept
ambiguous waivers. After an interrogation of an hour and a half,
Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."46 The Court said, by a
vote of five to four, that this statement did not require agents to ask
clarifying questions about whether Davis was requesting a lawyer.
Thus police can continue to question unless the suspect makes an
unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel. In this way, the
Davis Court dealt a serious blow to Miranda's "knowledge as power"
rationale.
The effect of the cases softening the waiver/invocation rules cannot
be tested by reading court opinions because courts rarely provide
enough detail to decide whether the waiver would have been upheld
or the invocation rejected if a different standard had been applied. As
we will see, courts found waiver in 68% of the cases.47 There is no way
to know how many of those waivers were fully informed and robust,
and how many were scared, pathetic efforts to try to outsmart the
police.
42. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
43. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
44. See id.
45. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
46. Id. at 455.
47. See infra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
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Thus, I make no claim to assess the overall effects of thirty-five
years of doctrine from Courts less committed to Miranda's ideals than
was the Warren Court. I can, however, offer a solid test of the Quarles
public safety exception and a solid test of how often prosecutors use
Harris to justify admission of a confession taken in violation of
Miranda. The evidence on the Elstad cat-out-of-the-bag doctrine will
be less than solid, but if police manipulate Elstad routinely, we should
pick up a fair number of cases just from courts reciting the facts.
In addition, my sample will disclose with precision the frequency
with which prosecutors use the exceptions created by the Miranda
opinion itself - that warnings are necessary only when a suspect is in
custody and police are engaging in interrogation.
V.

THE STUDY EXPLAINED

To get a national sample of stories about Miranda, I drew a sample
of cases that mentioned "Miranda" and made it into the Westlaw
database during June 2002.48 I chose this broad search because I
wanted to find as many cases as possible that discussed whether police
gave Miranda warnings even if no motion to suppress a statement was
made. In some cases where no motion was filed, I hypothesized, a
reader could determine whether warnings were given or how the
defendant reacted to the warnings. The facts might state, for example,
that the police gave Miranda warnings and the defendant waived his
rights. If the waiver was clear enough, the defendant might not make a
motion to suppress on Miranda grounds and the case could be
appealed on another ground. Some cases presented Fourth
Amendment and Miranda claims, and while the litigant did not press
the Miranda claim, the facts showed whether the warnings were given.
Similarly, in a few cases, the claim on appeal was ineffective assistance
of counsel for not raising a Miranda claim and the appellate court
provided information about the claim that could have been raised. Of
course, searching for "Miranda" produced some unusable cases - for
example, sometimes a party or a witness was named "Miranda."
A sample of 291 "Miranda" cases gave me a usable database of 2 1 1
cases. That database produced more than 211 entries in m y reported
results because some cases fit two, or even three, categories. For
example, in People v. Farnam,49 the court (1) admitted some

48. I was originally going to include all cases decided in June but some cases take weeks
and sometimes months to make it into the database so I decided to use the date they
appeared in Westlaw to constitute my sample. I stopped taking cases when I had a sufficient
number from which I thought I could get at least 200 usable cases. I wound up with 211. A
list of the original database and the cases used in the study, arranged by categories, is
available from the author.
49. 47 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2002).
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statements made before custody, (2) held that the suspect did not
invoke his right to remain silent after he was taken into custody, and
(3) rejected the claim that his later statements were coerced. This one
case thus produced three entries into my database. As long as the
claims were factually separate, as they were in Farnham, I included
each claim. After all, the enterprise was designed to understand how
police follow the Miranda rules and how prosecutors shape arguments.
Different facts from the same case can provide those data.
If the same facts gave rise to alternative explanations, however, I
tried to figure out which was the dominant theory for admitting or
suppressing the statements and entered the case only in that category.
Otherwise, I would be "double-counting" the same compliance or
noncompliance. Even when I could not determine which theory was
dominant in the court's mind, I chose the one that made the most
sense to me so as to avoid double counting. For example, in People v.
Wenzel,50 the defendant appeared voluntarily at police headquarters
and gave the police a letter in which he confessed to killing his wife.
The court gave no basis for why the letter was admissible (the
defendant did not challenge its admissibility). The letter is admissible
because Miranda requires warnings only when the police engage in
custodial interrogation; both custody and interrogation are missing in
Wenzel. To keep from double counting these facts, I essentially
"flipped a coin" and chose the "no interrogation" category.
The total number of entries in all categories was 246. I began with
the "usual suspects" for categories: warnings/no warnings; waiver/no
waiver; custody/no custody; interrogation/no interrogation; waiver
challenged/waiver not challenged. I found that it was useful to present
the data in various combinations. Table 1 summarizes the fifty-nine
"no warnings" claims and Table 2 does the same for the 186 claims
where warnings were given. Table 3 shows all outcomes by categories.
Table 4 focuses just on the cases where defendants claim they have
invoked the right to silence or to counsel. Table 5 looks only at the
cases where the defendant moved to suppress a statement and breaks
down the cases by the claim made and the outcome of the claim. Table
6 looks only at the cases where the defendant challenged either the
voluntariness of the waiver or of the statements that followed a
voluntary waiver.

50. No. 0037914, 2002 WL 1265558 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2002).
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No WARNINGS (60)

Suppress51

10

17%

2

3%

Admit because suspect
not in custody

28

47%

Admit because police
did not interrogate

14

23%53

Use to impeach52

Admit because of
public safety exception54

6

10%

No statement made

15

8%

Suspect claims no warnings. Suspect loses

11

6%

3

2%

126

68%

TABLE 2. WARNINGS GIVEN

(186)

Miranda violation, then warnings
and a statement

Suspect waives Miranda
Challenges waiver & loses
Does not challenge

51
75

Suspect does not waive; 55
5 1 . One case affirmed the conviction on a harmless error theory and two others held
that the failure to move to suppress was deficient lawyering under the Sixth Amendment.
See People v. Ward, 2002 WL 1272139 (Cal. App.) (harmless error); United States ex rel.
AM. v. Butler, 2002 WL 1348605 (N.D. Ill.) (counsel deficient); State v. Jorgensen, 650
N.W.2d 322 (Wis. App. 2002) (same). Because the point was to determine how often police
fail to comply with Miranda, and the State Jost or should have lost a confession it sought to
use to prove guilt, I included all three in the "suppress" category. I did not, however, include
the four Elstad cases (see Table 2). In these cases, an inadmissible statement is followed by
warnings and then an admissible statement. Because the State in each case got the
defendant's statement into evidence to prove guilt, it seemed trivial that one version of the
statement was inadmissible.
52. In People v. Lucero, 2002 WL 1424806 (Mich. App.), the court refused to permit a
Harris impeachment. I did not include that case in this table, however, because it appears in
Table 8, "challenge to waiver or interrogation; defendant wins."
53. These cases broke into the following subcategories: no questions asked, 7 cases;
booking questions, 3 cases; and statement "volunteered" after interrogation ended, 4 cases.
54. One case refused to find the public safety exception met. See United States v. Lutz,
207 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Kan. 2002). This case is included in the "suppress" category.
55. This category also includes cases where the suspect waived but his later statements
were held to be involuntary. In at least one of the cases, the court was not clear whether it
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statement suppressed

5

3%

Suspect claims he invoked
right to silence.

6

3%

Suspect claims he invoked
right to counsel.

20

11%

TABLE 3 . ALL CATEGORIES O F OUTCOMES (246)

No warnings; statement
suppressed as proof of guilt

5%

12

Statement used to impeach

2

No warnings; no custody

28

11%

N o warnings; no interrogation

14

6%

6

2%

15

6%

Suspect claims no warnings. Suspect loses. 1 1

4%

Miranda violation, then warnings
and a statement that is admitted

3

1%

Suspect waives Miranda and statements
ruled voluntary
126

51%

Suspect does not waive; statement
suppressed

5

2%

Suspect claims invocation of counsel;
questioning continues and he makes
statement that is admitted

9

4%

Suspect claims invocation of counsel;
questioning continues and he makes
statement that is suppressed

6

2%

Suspect invokes counsel; questioning
ceases

5

2%

Suspect claims h e invoked right t o silence;
questioning continues and he makes
statement
6

2%

No warnings; public safety exception
Suspect remains silent

was the waiver o r the statement that was involuntary. There i s o f course n o practical
difference.
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4. CLAIMS OF INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL A N D TO
(26)

SILENCE

Police ignore invocation
of right to counsel;
statement is suppressed

6

23%

Suspect invokes counsel; police
cease questioning

5

19%

Suspect invokes counsel and
reinitiates discussion of case

4

15%

No invocation of counsel found

5

19%

No invocation of silence found

6

23%

T ABLE

5. COMPILATION OF D ATA BY DEFENDANT SUPPRESSION
(153)

CLAIMS

Warnings were not given56
Successful challenge57

71

46%

56

37%

20

13%

6

4%

12

Challenge to waiver
or to later confession
Successful challenges

5

Invoked counsel
Successful challenge

6

Invoked silence
Successful challenge

0

6. CH ALLENGES TO WAIVER OR INTERROGATION BY
C ATEGORY (56)

T ABLE

General claim without
much detail
Successful

6 (11%)
2

56. This combines the cases from Table 1 where the State conceded no warnings (60)
with the cases from Table 3 where the defendant claimed no warnings but lost (11).
57. I count as successful the 2 cases in Table 1 where the State used the confession to
impeach. At least in theory, these statements are not being used to prove guilt.
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9 (16 % )

Deception, promises
0

Successful

16 (29% )

Coercion
2

Successful
General capacity to
understand warnings

11 (20%)
05s

Successful
Capacity (drugs or
alcohol)
Successful

8 (14%)
159

Capacity (language)

4 (7% )

Credibility

2

Successful
VI.

(4% )

0

THE INTERROGATION HYPOTHESES EXAMINED
A.

Miranda Compliance Hypotheses

The Leo and Cassell-Hayman studies found that police almost
always give the warnings as required by the Miranda doctrine.60 My
study found the compliance rate to be 95 % .61 Of course, my data
contain a potential reporting bias. If the defendant and the police tell a
different story about whether warnings were given, one would expect
judges to believe the police - and this is exactly what I found.
Defendants contested the warnings in eleven cases where the State
claimed warnings were given, and in each case the court deferred to

58. Some of the involuntary waiver cases could be viewed as turning on lack of capacity
to understand the warnings, but I chose to categorize them as coercion cases.
59. In one case, the trial court found no waiver because of intoxication. The appellate
court deferred to trial court's suppression because the real issue was whether the statements
were involuntary and thus inadmissible under Harris. People v. Lucero, 2002 WL 1424806
(Mich. App.). The other involved the 1 1 year old suspect. See United States ex rel. Butler,
2002 WL 1348605 (N.D. Ill.).
60. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 889 (reporting at most a noncompliance
rate of 2%); Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 276 (noting that police read warnings in "virtually
every interrogation" that he observed).
61. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 3 (reporting that statements are
suppressed for failure to give warnings in only 5% of the cases).
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the trial court's findings in favor of the State.62 This might be because
the defendants were not particularly credible witnesses, because the
police were telling the truth, because suppression judges are more
likely to believe police, because police are skillful liars, or, more likely,
some combination of these factors.
But one fact is clear from my study: when the State asserts that the
suspect was given warnings, defendants challenge that assertion in
only 6% of the cases.63 That so few challenges are even made is a
confirmation of the compliance findings in the Leo and the Cassell
Hayman studies. This is the least controversial of the hypotheses that I
tried to test in my study, but the data clearly support the hypothesis.
Given the earlier studies and my confirmation, we can confidently
claim that police have adjusted to the rule that they must warn
suspects before beginning custodial interrogation.
A second hypothesis is that suspects waive Miranda in large
numbers. Leo found that 78% of suspects waived Miranda.64 Cassell
and Hayman found an 84% rate.65 In my sample, the suspect waived
Miranda 68% of the time.66 That my rate is relatively close to the rates
found by Cassell-Hayman and Leo tends to confirm that suspects
waive Miranda in large numbers. Another way to slice these data is to
consider the proportion of waivers found valid by courts - 126 versus invocations that either resulted in suppression or caused the
interrogation to end - 11.67 Here I do not count the suspects who
remain silent as invoking Miranda. More than 10 times as many
suspects waived Miranda as invoked! Even if one counts all 15
suspects who did not answer questions68 as silently invoking, the ratio
is still 5 to 1 (126 to 26).
A third way to examine these data is to ask what percentage of
suspects who received warnings resisted the police interrogation. To
make this calculation, I added to the 11 invocations the 15 suspects
who remained silent and removed from the total universe of cases
those in which the suspect was not warned (60).69 This gives me a

62. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
63. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
64. Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 276.
65. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 859.
66. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
67. For purposes of this comparison, I used the waivers as found by courts. See supra
Part V, paying special attention to Table 2. Invocations of counsel that result in suppression
or cause questioning to cease are the first two entries in Table 4. See supra Part V, paying
special attention to Table 4.
68. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
69. See Tables 1 & 2.
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"resistance" rate of 14% (26/ 186).70 In Leo's study, 22% of suspects
did not cooperate71 while the Cassell-Hayman number was 16% .72
Three studies have thus now concluded that suspects do not often
resist police interrogation after receiving Miranda warnings. Had we
presented these numbers to Yale Kamisar and the members of the
Miranda Court in 1966, they likely would have been stunned.73
The implication of the huge number of waivers is staggering. In the
universe of cases where suspects answer questions without invoking
the right to counsel or to silence, the issue is precisely the one that
Miranda sought to avoid: Did the suspect act voluntarily when waiving
or when answering police questions after waiving? In my sample this
was the issue 13 1 times, or in 70% of the cases where statements were
given.74 The irony here is that more than half of the admissibility issues
are thus resolved by the voluntariness test that Miranda thought
insufficiently protective of free will. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, in 75
of the waiver cases, the answer was so clearly "yes" that the defendant
did not even raise the issue!75 In the rest of the cases challenging
waiver or the voluntariness of the subsequent statements, defendants
lost almost all of them (5 1 of 5 6 cases).76 Thus, when the issue is the
voluntariness of the waiver or the answers after waiver, the State wins
96% of the time (126 of 13 1 cases).77

70. My methodology probably depresses the estimate of the suspects who resist police
interrogation. Though I found 15 examples of suspects remaining silent, suspects who remain
silent are less likely to be prosecuted and thus less likely to appeal.
7 1 . Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 275 tbl. 2.
72. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 16, at 859 tbl. 3.
73. Yale Kamisar reminded me that Earl Warren worked as a prosecutor and state
attorney general for 22 years and thus had an intimate knowledge of police interrogation and
suspect behavior. Perhaps Warren would not have been surprised by my data. Perhaps he
expected suspects to continue to try to outsmart police and wanted only to give them a fair
chance by informing them that they did not have to talk. For a fuller perspective on
Warren's law enforcement experience as it might have molded his views on criminal
procedure doctrine, see Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's 22 Years in Law Enforcement
Affected His Work As Chief Justice, paper presented at the University of California,
Berkeley, Symposium on Earl Warren and the Warren Court: A Fifty Year Retrospect,
February 27-28, 2004 (forthcoming OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.).
74. From Table 2, combine the "suspect waives Miranda" figure with the "suspect does
not waive; statement suppressed." See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.
75. It is possible, of course, that defendants do not raise a plausible waiver claim
because of their view (their lawyers' view) that the issue is simply not winnable. But my
sample is mostly appellate cases. These defendants and lawyers showed themselves willing to
go to trial and then appeal the conviction. Assuming competent lawyering, it makes no sense
to forfeit an issue that might lead to suppression at trial or to a reversal on appeal.
76. Defendants won 5 cases and lost 51. See supra Part V, paying special attention to
Table 2.
77. In Table 2, add the 5 cases where the court found no waiver to the 126 cases where
the court found that the suspect waived Miranda. See supra Table 2.
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The third hypothesis drawn from the earlier studies is that when a
suspect invokes his right to remain silent or to counsel, police
generally cease questioning. Though my data point roughly in the
opposite direction, the sample is small and here the methodological
problems with my survey technique are particularly troublesome. In
my study, suspects claimed to have invoked silence in six cases and
counsel in twenty cases, a total of twenty-six invocations, and police
ceased questioning only five times.78 Of course, the relevant
benchmark is not twenty-six claims of invocation but the actual
number of invocations that police accepted or that judges found to
have occurred - fifteen.79 In that universe, police complied with
Miranda nine times (the defendant successfully moved to suppress in
six cases). Thus, in this small sample of fifteen, police complied with
Miranda more than half the time.
But taking a sample of mostly appellate cases is bound to
overrepresent the number of times the police ignored invocation of
the right to counsel or the right to silence. When police comply with
the edict to stop questioning, the case may never go forward. If it does,
no Miranda issue is likely to surface. Thus, on this issue, my study
neither confirms nor rejects the working hypothesis that police
generally comply with the requirement that the interrogation must
cease following invocation of the right to silence or to counsel.
The fourth working hypothesis is that police do not frequently use
elaborate trickery or overtly coercive interrogation methods to get a
waiver. The fifth hypothesis is that police do not use trickery or
overtly coercive methods to get a confession following waiver. Though
these are distinct doctrinal issues, I found that I could not test for
them separately in my data. Defendants and courts conflated these
issues in most cases, probably because the standard for resolving them
is the same: Did the defendant act voluntarily when answering police
questions? I will thus lump hypotheses four and five together for the
rest of the paper. When I describe a claim of coercion or
involuntariness, it should be understood as a challenge to the waiver
or to the confession itself The data produced by my study on this
hypothesis are open to interpretation, and I will devote a Section to
sorting through the cases on coercion and trickery. But first, I will
offer some tentative observations from my data that exist outside my
five hypotheses.
It comes as no surprise that when courts find that police did give
warnings in a particular case, the chance of having the statements
admitted is generally better. Table 6 shows that courts found only five
waivers or answers to subsequent questions to be involuntary (one of
78. See supra Table 4.
79. See supra Table 4, combining first three categories.
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those cases involved a suspect who was eleven years old and the court
made much of his age on the voluntariness issue80). The likelihood of
having a statement suppressed is greatest when defendants claim they
invoked one of the Miranda rights, though they lost all six cases in
which they claimed to invoke the right to silence. Defendants were
much more successful, in a small database, when they invoked
counsel.81 Defendants effectively invoked counsel fifteen times.82
Police ceased questioning, as required by Miranda, in five cases. In the
other ten cases, the suspect wound up making an incriminating
statement. In six of those cases, the statement was suppressed. In the
other four, the court held that the suspect had re-initiated
conversation about the crime and thus the police were permitted to
seek a waiver of Miranda.83 In sum, statements were suppressed in six
cases and questioning ceased in five more (another way a suspect
could "win" by invoking counsel) for a favorable outcome from the
suspect's perspective in eleven of fifteen cases where a court found or
police accepted an invocation of counsel. Though this is too small a
sample to provide a robust finding, the data suggest what our intuition
tells us: the way for a suspect to avoid incriminating himself after he is
given Miranda warnings is to request counsel.
Two other tantalizing inferences can be drawn from my universe of
cases. One is that police and prosecutors manage quite nicely to get
what they want in a Miranda world. When police give warnings, the
suspect waives his rights and answers questions in 68% of those
cases.84 More startling, prosecutors manage to get 80% of statements
admitted to prove guilt even when no warnings were given!85 To be
sure, Miranda contemplated the admissibility of statements made
while the suspect was not in custody or was not subject to
interrogation. Still, that 80% of the no-warnings cases result in

80. United States ex rel. A.M. v. Butler, No. 98 C 5625, 2002 WL 1348605 (N.D . Ill . June
19, 2002).
81. While the sample of cases where suspects invoked counsel is too small to claim a
robust finding, defendants won more motions to suppress in this sample of fifteen (six cases)
than they did in a sample of fifty-six challenges to warnings, waiver, and the mode of
interrogation (five cases). See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 5.
82. See supra Table 4.
83. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (creating a "re-initiation" exception to
the rule that a request for counsel forbids the police from asking further questions). For
Kamisar's persuasive critique of the Court's subsequent application of the re-initiation
doctrine, see Yale Kamisar, The Edwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the
Court Taketh Away, in 5 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 153 (J.
Choper et al. eds., 1984).
84. See supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 2.

85. See supra Table 1. Of statements taken without warnings, 17% were suppressed and
3% were used only for impeachment, meaning that 80% were admitted to prove guilt. See
supra Part V, paying special attention to Table 1 .
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admission of the statement to prove guilt would likely have stunned
the 1 965 Yale Kamisar and the Miranda Court. I doubt that it stuns
the 2004 Kamisar.
The third inference, a corollary really of the principle that police
can usually get what they want by operating close to the Miranda line,
is that police do not need to use coercion or elaborate trickery to get a
confession. This brings us to the fourth and fifth hypotheses, and
because my finding here involves more of a judgment call than the
first three hypotheses, I devote the next Section to it.
B.

Claims of Coercion, Trickery, and Involuntariness

The Supreme Court has never provided a comprehensive
framework within which to think about how coercion might be
different from a general claim 0f involuntariness or how trickery might
affect a court's decision about voluntariness. But a rough distinction
can be teased from the Court's many confession cases. An involuntary
statement is one that results from the suspect's overborne will.86 One's
will can be overborne by factors that have nothing to do with the
police, such as intoxication or lack of capacity to make a rational
choice.87 Trickery is simply a way that humans induce a lack of
capacity to make a rational choice. Coercion is more narrowly focused
on overt pressures brought to bear on the suspect by other human
agents - police in this context. One does not feel pressure when
tricked or when one acts involuntarily because of some incapacity. On
the other hand, one feels the pressure of coercion. If you sell me a rare
coin that you know to be a fake, you have tricked me out of my
money. If you put a gun to my head and say, "your money or your
life," you have coerced me out of my money. If I give you my money
because my mental defect causes me to mistake you for my lover, my
act is involuntary. We will see all three categories of claims in this
section.
Scholars have found cases in which the police use pretty flagrant
coercion or massive trickery to get a confession.88 I wondered what
kind of stories of coercion and trickery I would find in a sample of 211
cases. Table 6 presents these claims by category.89 So what do these
cases show? It is useful to divide these claims into ones where police
are engaged in some kind of misconduct and cases where they are

86. See, e.g. , Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
87. See, e.g. , Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (holding that a confession can be
involuntary when induced by a drug that functioned as a "truth serum" even if police did not
know drug had that property).
88. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text, for an example.
89. See supra Table 6.
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taking advantage of a preexisting lack of capacity. Coercion,
deception, or trickery constituted 45 % of the claims that the waiver or
statement was involuntary. Lack of capacity, of one kind or another,
explained 41 % of the claims.90 But what interests us is how frequently
these claims occur in the universe of all cases where suspects make
statements. That number in my study was 226.91 Defendants made a
total of 56 challenges to waiver or to the interrogation.92 Thus, 25% of
the statements were challenged. It is difficult to say, in the abstract,
whether that is a high enough percentage to call into question the Leo
data finding only a 2% coercion rate.93 For one thing, almost all of the
claims in my study were rejected by courts; Leo might have failed to
find coercion in most of these cases. For another, my methodological
assumption has been that appellate cases will contain stronger cases
for suppression than the vast majority of cases that never make it to
trial. But it is nonetheless useful to investigate the claims in my
database to get a flavor of how courts describe the claims that
defendants present and argue at the motion to suppress.
What struck me most about the cases seeking suppression of
statements was the lack of detail in the claims, at least as they were
described by the courts. The typical claim was that the waiver or
confession was involuntary or that the police used trickery or
deception, with few underlying details as to what constituted the
coercion or the trickery. In State v. Aponte,94 for example, the court
describes the challenge to the confession as simply that it was coerced,
without pointing to any underlying facts.95 If the descriptions in the
court opinions are an accurate rendition of the way the lawyers
presented the claims, it appears that some of these claims are either
boilerplate or simply unsupported by the record.

90. The balance of the claims in Table 6 could not be classified because of insufficient
detail in the reported case - general claims and cases that turned exclusively on credibility.
See supra Table 6.
91. In Table 3, subtract from 246 the suspects who remain silent (15) and the suspects
who invoke counsel and police cease questioning (5).
92. See supra Table 6.
93. Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 282-83.
94. 800 A.2d 420 (R.1. 2002).
95. Id. at 424 (noting that the "defendant maintains that the police used coercive tactics
to obtain his involuntary confession"). The court ignored the coercion claim when deciding
whether the confession was admissible, instead focusing only on the issue of whether
defendant was in custody when he was interrogated. Id. at 424-26. The court held that he was
not in custody and seemed to think that this holding resolved the claim that the police
coerced the confession. A coercion claim is of course theoretically independent of a Miranda
claim. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1999) (holding inadmissible because
involuntary a statement that would have been admissible under Miranda).
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General Claim (6 claims; 11% of total challenges)

Sometimes the lawyer failed even to articulate a plausible basis for
a claim of involuntariness. A good example in this category is United
States v. Williams.96 The defendant signed a written acknowledgment
and waiver of Miranda and then, after an interrogation that lasted less
than an hour, gave a statement to an interrogator who the defendant
later said was "a gentleman to the fullest. "97 On this record, the
defendant's claim that his statements were involuntary was simply not
plausible. But two defendants prevailed on involuntariness claims
without much detail as to why the waiver was no good. In one, the
Ninth Circuit, with almost no discussion, deferred to the district
court's findings that "the government had not carried its burden of
proving that [defendant] had knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights."98 The only description of the claim was that the
suppression hearing featured "sharply conflicting testimony as to
whether [defendant's] Miranda rights had been fully respected."99 It's
not clear to me what it means to "fully respect[]" a suspect's Miranda
rights.100 In a similar case, a state court held that "the state presented
very little evidence that showed defendant made a knowing and
voluntary waiver" of his Miranda rights.101 Both of these cases seem to
take seriously the notion from Miranda that the State has the burden
of proving waiver.
2.

Credibility (2 claims; 4% of total challenges)

Several of the rejected claims entail at least an implicit judgment
that the defendant lacked credibility. But when the court rejected the
substantive basis of the claim - rejected, for example, that the police
had promised a short sentence in exchange for a confession - I
counted those in the substantive category rather than as a bare
credibility issue. But two cases turned exclusively on credibility. In
United States v. Ragbir,102 the defendant argued that the trial judge
should have believed his coconspirator rather than the detective on
the facts surrounding the putative waiver. The Third Circuit remarked,
"We will not review the District Court's credibility determination."103
96. 291 F.3d 1 1 80 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 1 190.
98. United States v. Ramirez-Arce, 37 Fed. App. 862, 863 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. State

v.

Vigne, 820 So. 2d 533, 539 (La. 2002).

102. 38 Fed. App. 788 (3d Cir. 2002).
103. Id. at 790.

Stories About Miranda

August 2004)

1983

In the other pure credibility case lost by a defendant, it was the jury
who rejected defendant's claim that the police were lying and that
issue was not raised directly on appeal.104
A defendant won one, and only one, case where credibility was
apparently the key issue.105 The opinion offers no facts but does
comment on the "sharply conflicting testimony as to whether
[defendant's] Miranda rights had been fully respected."106 I note the
case here because of its credibility dimension but I include the case in
the involuntary-waiver category because the court characterized it
that way.
3.

Deception/Promises (9 claims; 16% of total challenges)

Most of these cases were pretty short on detail and credibility
played a part here too. In one, the court described two claims: one was
"a promise by the officer that [the suspect] would not be prosecuted";
the other was simply that the officer had "tricked him" into making an
admission.107 The district court concluded that the defendant "lied
when he said an officer tricked him into confessing and that he lied
when he said the officer promised that he would not be prosecuted if
he made the taped confession,"108 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
In State v. Crute,109 the defendant said he asked how much time he
faced, and the officer said, " [W]hen they get a confession you'll get
like 3 to 6 months."110 The officer denied saying that, the trial court
resolved the credibility issue against the defendant, and the appellate
court affirmed. In Williams v. State,111 the defendant contended that
the officer "suggested to [him] that he be truthful or [his girlfriend and
child] could be in trouble."112 The trial and appellate courts accepted
the police officer's contrary version of the facts: "Perry testified that
he made no such threat to Williams. Indeed, there is no evidence
supporting Williams' [sic] version of events."113

104. People v. Poquette, No. 225291 , 2002 WL 1 275495 (Mich. Ct. App. June 7, 2002).
The issue on appeal was whether the prosecutor's attempt to bolster the police credibility
was proper.
105. United States v. Ramirez-Arce, 37 Fed. App. 862, 863 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Id.
107. United States

v.

Hayton, 38 Fed. App. 871, 872-73 (4th Cir. 2002).

108. Id. at 874.
109. No. 26144-8-Il, 2002 WL 1281943 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7, 2002).
110. Crute, 2002 WL 1281943, at *1 (alteration in original).
111. 565 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
1 12. Id. at 918 (alterations in original).
113. Id.
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In People v. Beal,114 the defendant testified:
[F]rom the evening of his arrest until he was interviewed the next day, he
was provided with no food or drink, that he felt intimidated when he
initially signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, and that before he
provided statements at a second interview the police had beaten him and
threatened him with a gun.115

Plenty of detail, to be sure, but the trial judge called the story a
"complete fabrication."116 The trial judge concluded:
[Defendant's] demeanor while he was testifying was of somebody
looking for ways he could avoid telling the truth. I do not believe
[defendant's] story of a beating, I do not believe his story of a gun being
held to his head, and I do not believe that he was deprived of food or
water or sleep.117

Noting that credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and that
the defendant did not explain on appeal why the trial judge was
wrong, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that he had "forfeited
appellate consideration of [this] argument. "118 That the defendant did
note press his coercion claim on appeal suggests that he recognized the
futility of getting the appellate court to overturn the trial court's
judgment about credibility.
An alternative way to resolve these claims against defendants is to
concede the promise or deception but hold that it does not render the
statement involuntary. This occurred in State v. Long,119 where the
defendant argued that the deceptive characterization of the lie
detector results rendered his waiver involuntary. The court agreed
that there was "an element of deception" in the officer's conduct but
given the totality of the circumstances found the waiver was not
involuntary.120 This approach accords with general due process
coercion doctrine.121
4.

Capacity (23 cases; 41 % of total challenges)

I divided capacity claims into three subcategories in Table 6 but
will discuss them together here.122 Capacity claims involve the same
114. No. 230862, 2002 WL 1340894 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 2002).
115. Beal, 2002 WL 1340894, at *2.
1 16. Id. (quoting trial judge).
1 17. Id. at *2-*3 (quoting trial judge).
1 18. Id. at *5.
1 19. No. 00-2087, 2002 WL 1071917 (Iowa Ct. App. May 31, 2002).
120. Long, 2002 WL 1071917, at *3.
121. See, e.g. , Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
122. See supra Table 6.
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underlying question as the coercion and deception claims. If the
suspect had sufficient capacity to make a voluntary decision, then the
waiver is good or the statement voluntary, and thus admissible. One
defendant who used insanity as a defense claimed that he lacked the
capacity to understand the warnings. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's reliance on police testimony that the defendant "appeared
to understand what was being discussed, including his Miranda
rights. "123 One defendant claimed that her statements were involuntary
because of her "emotional state at the time of her arrest" and her
belief that if she gave the statement she could "avoid being prosecuted
for the marijuana found in her car. "124 The state court did not agree.
One defendant claimed that the waiver was invalid because the
Spanish language form did not use the word "waiver"; the Ninth
Circuit held that waiver was present where warnings were given orally,
defendant indicated understanding, and answered "yes" to the
question "Are you willing to answer some questions?"125
The Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that being under the influence
of morphine rendered the waiver involuntary when the facts showed
the suspect was alert and cooperated with the agent in giving a very
detailed statement.126 The Tenth Circuit rejected a claim that a suspect
was too drunk to remember being given the warnings or signing the
form because the defendant admitted at trial that he had been given
his rights.127 A state court rejected a claim that the suspect's capacity
was overcome by a gunshot wound and pain medication because the
officer testified that the suspect "did not appear to be in any sort of
pain at the time of [the] interview, nor did he have any mental or
intellectual deficiency. "128
5.

Coercion (16 claims; 29% of total challenges)

Most of these claims were pretty thin. Two cases featured a
remarkable argument: that the urging of the police officer to tell the
truth made the statements involuntary.129 Imagine suggesting to Oliver

123. Mitten v. State, 79 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
124. State v. Washburn, No. W2001-01847-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1284324, at *4 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 1 1 , 2002).
125. United States v. Castro-Cardenas, 40 Fed. App. 488, 489 (9th Cir. 2002).
126. United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Zepeda-Armenta, 36 Fed. App. 315 (9th Cir. 2002); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 769 N.E.2d
1231 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
127. United States v. Alexander, 292 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2002).
128. State v. Johnson, 821 So. 2d 652, 661 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
129. People v. Ortiz, No. F036564, 2002 WL 1814130 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2002) ;
People v. Rivera, 743 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
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Wendell Holmes or Felix Frankfurter, let alone Immanuel Kant, that
the exhortation to tell the truth coerced a statement from a suspect!
One defendant admitted that he received the warnings and told the
detective he understood them.130 But he claimed coercion based on the
following exchange. The detective said, "Well would you like to kind
of start at the beginning and, and tell us what's going on?"131 The
defendant responded, "Which part or what[?]," and the detective
replied, "Well why don't we start uh [on the day of the killing?]"132 As
to a claim that this exchange was coercive, the state court of appeals
sniffed, "[n]ot so. The detective's words were in interrogatory form
and were not leading. At most it suggested where [the defendant]
might start if he chose to talk."133
In State v. Cordova,134 the defendant alleged that the police
"badgered him, used extremely leading questions, and placed undue
pressure on him."135 The only specific example mentioned in the
opinion was that one of the officers claimed to be an expert in
detecting deception and knew that the suspect was lying.136 An Idaho
appellate court found, without much discussion, that his will was not
overborne. Again, this is standard coercion doctrine. One of the
factors the court explicitly considered in reaching its judgment was
that the police gave him Miranda warnings and he signed a written
waiver acknowledging that he understood them. In effect, the Miranda
warnings were used to make it easier to find a lack of coercion.
Perhaps the theory is that the warnings nullify the effect of most police
pressure that follows the waiver.137
I found no cases in the capacity categories that gave me reason to
disagree with the court's holdings. But I did uncover three
coercion/trickery cases where the defendant lost the motion to
suppress but, in my view, should have won.

130. People v. Mata, No. G027682, 2002 WL 1272173 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 2002).
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id.
133. Id. The defense might plausibly claim that indicating knowledge of the rights is not
sufficient to show waiver. The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on this claim. But to
argue that the question was coercive was, well, nutty.
134. 51 P.3d 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
135. Cordova, 51 P.3d at 452.
136. Id.
137. Perhaps the assumption is that suspects will remember the warnings and shut down
the interrogation if the pressure becomes coercive. William Stuntz has argued that the
Warren Court sought to create suspect "safety valves" - "conditional talkers" who would
invoke the Miranda rights when the interrogation got too "hot." See William J. Stuntz,
Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001).
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a. Questionable applications of voluntariness doctrine.

In State v. Bunting,138 the suspect waived his Miranda rights,139 and
the issue was whether his subsequent responses were voluntary. The
police suspected Bunting of killing his four-year-old son while helping
him take a bath. In preparation for the interview, police contacted ah
expert in interrogation techniques for advice about how to question
Bunting. The expert "recommended using a confrontational interview
approach involving misrepresentations of the evidence the detectives
had implicating D efendant and the 'false friend' technique. "140 The
police took this advice. The defendant argued that his confession was
involuntary because it was caused by "misrepresentations about the
evidence, threats, promises of leniency, and the false friend
technique." 1 41 The State did not deny the underlying facts. The court
treated each claim of coercion independently, concluding in each case
that the technique did not overcome the suspect's will or was
insufficiently coercive to render the confession inadmissible.
Because these cases are extremely fact dependent, I will quote the
key part of the interrogation. All deletions and emphases are the
court's work. The State's suspicion was based on the medical
examiner's conclusion that the child had not drowned. No one at this
point knew the cause of death.
Detective Mitchell: . . . [T]he hammer is ready to fall, and that's why we
wanted to talk with you, okay? [Defendant]: Okay. Detective
Mitchell: . . . The ME [medical examiner] has wrapped up his
investigation, okay. He has forensic evidence - or, excuse me - Sgt.
Vaughn: Scientific evidence. . . . Detective Mitchell: Okay. [Son] did not
drown. [Defendant): Uh-huh. Detective Mitchell: [Son] was murdered, is
what he's saying, okay. There's evidence of proof we can show that the
scene was altered. . . . Do you understand what I am saying there?
[Defendant): Uh-huh. . . . Sgt. Vaughn: . . . The medical examiner is
saying [Son] was murdered. That leaves you to be the murderer. If you
want to go in front of the judge and a jury, and be seen as a premeditated
murderer, and there are no other facts that we need to know about it, I
don't think you want that, do you? [Defendant] : Huh-uh. . . . Sgt.
Vaughn: . . . [W]e're going to the district attorney. . . . Now, he can either
charge you with first degree homicide, or we can find out from you
exactly everything that happened that night. . . . I think it's more like a
manslaughter . . . it's something reckless . . . it's something stupid, or
maybe something negligent that happened that caused that death. You're
the one with the answers. You're the one [who] can bail your ass out.

138. 51 P.3d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 41.

1988

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:1959

Like I said, the medical examiners want to hang you out to dry right
now . . . . This is your chance. . . . [Defendant]: The only other thing that
was there that night was I had (inaudible) some bubbles in the tub with a
jug of Freon . . 142
.

.

Freon was later determined to be the cause of death. The court's
opinion did not state why the defendant put Freon in the tub, but the
State charged only child abuse homicide rather than murder so one
assumes Bunting thought the Freon bubbles would make the child
enjoy the bath. As an air conditioner repairman, however, "he knew
the dangers of inhaling Freon in a closed environment, including that
it robs lungs of oxygen. "143
In addition to the claims of coercion, promises, and
misrepresentation, B unting also argued that "the detectives
intentionally played upon his vulnerable mental and psychological
conditions to induce incriminating statements. "144 The appellate court
rejected that argument as well. "[W]e conclude the detectives' tactics
did not exploit any known mental or psychological condition of
Defendant."145 But the court studiously avoided looking at how the
police coercion, promises, and misrepresentation might combine to
overbear the suspect's will. The Supreme Court, in the "bad old days"
before Miranda was much more willing to see the whole picture.
In Miller v. State,146 the defendant claimed "that his statement to
the police should have been suppressed because it was the result of
coercion, manipulation, and fabricated evidence, in combination with
his vulnerable mental state."147 He argued that the "totality of the
circumstances creates a full picture of the unwitting mentally retarded
defendant being led down the path to his own detriment, the path
being paved by lies and coercion."148 The trial court found, and the
appellate court did not disagree, that the defendant was mentally
retarded,149 though the opinion provides no details about how
profoundly he was retarded. The appellate court commented that
there was "no allegation or indication that police knew that he was
mentally retarded,'' that "he did not appear to be incoherent or under
the influence of alcohol or drugs."150

142. Id. at 42.
143. Id. at 40.
144. Id. at 44.
145. Id. at 45.
146. 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002).
147. Id. at 766.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 769.
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Miller is an example of a fundamental problem with the due
process voluntariness doctrine as applied by lower courts. If a
defendant is mentally retarded, and thus less capable of acting on his
own will, what possible difference could it make that the police did not
know of his retardation? Either his will was overborne or it was not.
But courts are always balancing two different goals when applying the
voluntariness test: protecting the suspect's free will and preventing
police misconduct. When the focus is on controlling police conduct,
which Kamisar has long seen as the transcendent goal,151 the suspect's
will tends to get lost. The converse is also true: when the police engage
in misconduct, the courts emphasize the sturdiness of the defendant's
will. To take a cynical view, perhaps when courts want to affirm a
conviction, they will focus on the police conduct if it looks like the
suspect's will was overborne, and if the police have admittedly
engaged in misconduct, courts will claim that the suspect's will was
sturdy enough to withstand that misconduct.
In addition to the retardation issue in Miller, the State admitted
that the detective told three lies to the suspect: (1) he told Miller that
witnesses had seen him "in the hallway outside the victim's first floor
office" when in fact the witness saw the suspect only in the upstairs
hallway; (2) the detective "presented the defendant with a fabricated
fingerprint card and computer printout and represented that the
defendant's fingerprints had been found in the victim's office"; and (3)
the detective "showed the defendant the police report that stated that
the victim died of natural causes" when the detective knew that the
report was erroneous.152 The detective used lie number three to
"suggest[] to the defendant that the death could have been an
accident. "153
Relying on an earlier case that held voluntary a confession made
after police lied about witnesses and fingerprints - Henry v. State154 the Indiana Supreme Court noted the "totality of the substantial
probative evidence of voluntariness shown by the record" and found
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his
rights, and that his incriminatory statements admitted in evidence
were voluntarily given."155 The court failed to note that Henry did not
involve a mentally retarded suspect, indeed the court in that case

151. Yale Kamisar argued in 1963 that whatever courts said about voluntariness and
free will, most of what they did was explained best as preventing police misconduct in the
interrogation room. Yale Kamisar, What Is An "Involuntary" Confession, 17 RUTGERS L.
REV. 728 (1963).
152 Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 768.
153. Id.
154. 738 N.E.2d 663 ( Ind. 2000).
155. Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 770.
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found Henry to be of "average intelligence."156 This is a good example
of a court dismissing mental retardation as a potential problem along
the police misconduct axis and then appearing to forget about the
retardation when assessing whether the suspect's will was
overborne. 157
But in recognition of the suspect's retardation, the court held that
the trial court erred in refusing to permit the jury to hear the
testimony of one defense witness, Dr. Richard Ofshe, an expert in the
"social psychology of police interrogation and false confessions."158 On
retrial, therefore, the defendant's confession will be admissible as
voluntary but so will Ofshe's testimony "regarding the psychology of
relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation of
mentally retarded persons, topics outside common knowledge and
experience."159 The point here, at least according to the defendant's
argument on appeal, is that without Ofshe's testimony, "there was
nothing to explain to the jury why someone, confronted with lies,
would then falsely admit to a crime."160 Thus, the real basis for the
court's recognition of the suspect's retardation seems to be the fear of
a false confession rather than an involuntary one.
Oddly, three of the five cases where a court found in favor of the
defendant did not contain the level of overreaching and police
misconduct that occurred in Bunting and Miller. I discussed two of
these cases earlier.161 In a third case won by the defendant, the
appellate court deferred to the trial court's finding that the defendant
was too intoxicated to make voluntary statements.162 The real issue in
this case was whether the statements could be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony. The appellate court ruled that if the defendant
lacked the capacity to make voluntary statements, they could not be
used to impeach. As the real issue was impeachment, rather than
voluntariness, no facts appear about the extent of the suspect's
drunkenness.

156. Henry, 738 N.E.2d at 665.
157. For a more fundamental critique of how judges apply Miranda to retarded suspects,
see Morgan Cloud, George B. Shepherd, Alison Nodvin Barkoff & Justin V. Shur, Words
Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 495 (2002). The researchers conducted an empirical study to determine whether
retarded people can understand the warnings and whether they are capable of voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waivers of those rights. The researchers concluded that the concept
of a retarded person making a valid waiver of Miranda was possible only if one is "willing to
manipulate and distort the very meaning" of voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 591 .
158. Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 770 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 17 (49500-9908-CR-445)).
159. Id. at 774.
160. Id. at 772 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 10 (49500-9908-CR-445)).
161. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
162. People v. Lucero, No. 231977, 2002 WL 1424806 (Mich. Ct. App. June 28, 2002).
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The fourth case finding an involuntary confession, People v.
Traylor, 1 63 is also short on facts, as the court used a presumption to
rule in the defendant's favor. The defendant presented evidence that,
after interrogation, he had a bruise on his nose that was not present
before the interrogation began. Because he "proved that he had been
injured 'while in police custody,' the State was required to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant's] injuries were not
inflicted as a means of producing a confession."164 The defendant won
when the State did not discharge that burden of proof. This is certainly
a common sense presumption, given the difficulty of proving coercion,
but because of the presumption, the underlying facts of the
interrogation nowhere appear in the opinion.
The fifth case is hard to categorize because the suspect was eleven
years old and the issue on habeas was whether the lawyer was
ineffective when he failed to move to suppress the confession.165 The
facts are complicated, and the court relies in part on the failure of the
police to have a Youth Officer present for the first interrogation.
Moreover, the court does not actually reach the issue of voluntariness.
But the court does conclude that had defendant's lawyer made a
motion to suppress the confession, it "would have enjoyed a very high
probability of success."166 Thus I chose to include it as a successful
challenge based on coercion.
b. Questionable reading of the record and application of the
doctrine: the strange case ofJuan Carlos Chavez.

In a remarkable coincidence that I did not notice until near the end
of this project, my Westlaw sample picked up Chavez v. State,167 the
case that Alfredo Garcia used in 2000 to illustrate how Miranda makes
it easier for police to disguise coercion.168 Garcia drew on trial court
records from 1995. It took seven years for the case to wind its way to
the Florida Supreme Court and, by pure chance, it showed up in my
sample. I selected the Chavez case from my sample as the one with the
most detailed and credible claim of coercion and, in an early draft of
this paper, had included Garcia's discussion of what I thought was a
different Chavez case as an example of a case with much more
coercive facts. It finally dawned on me that, though seven years apart
and with quite different factual accounts, they were the same case!
163. 771 N.E.2d 629 (Ill. Ct. App.2002).
164. Traylor, 771 N.E.2d at 633.
165. United States ex rel. A.M. v . Butler, 2002 WL 1348605 (N.D. Ill.)
166. Id. at *21.
167. 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002).
168. Garcia, supra note 20.
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The facts of the case are gruesome. Chavez not only admitted
kidnapping, raping, and murdering a nine-year-old boy, but also that
three days later he dismembered the body into three parts to get it to
fit in three planters in a barn. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Juan Carlos Chavez's conviction and death sentence, describing the
facts of the interrogation very differently from the account in Garcia's
article. As to which description is closer to the truth, my money is on
Garcia. Here is his description drawn from the trial records:
Police detectives interrogated the suspect for a total of thirty hours
before he was allowed to sleep. During that period of time, the suspect
was interrogated by three different teams of detectives, not counting the
polygraph examiner who administered two polygraph examinations.
Detectives secured Miranda waivers from the suspect a short period of
time after the interrogation began at headquarters and approximately
ten-and-one-half hours after the first waiver, after which they confronted
Chavez with the negative results of both polygraph examinations. At that
time, they let the suspect get some sleep within the cramped confines of
the interrogation room. The defendant slept on the "carpeted floor of the
interrogation room." . . .
The interrogation resumed the next morning, after the suspect slept
for six hours . . . . After the interrogation continued, a member of the
public defender's office contacted the homicide office and attempted
unsuccessfully to gain access to the suspect. At the forty-four hour mark
of the interrogation, Chavez finally broke down and acknowledged
participation, though accidental, in the victim's death and acknowledged
that he had disposed of the victim's body . . . 169
.

Here is how the Florida Supreme Court described, and resolved,
the coercion claim in the same case:
Although Chavez was questioned over the course of several days, he
was provided with food, drink, and cigarettes (as requested) at
appropriate times, and permitted to have frequent breaks. His
interrogation was also interspersed with time away from the police
facilities for visits to various properties, a six-hour rest period (where
Chavez was offered a blanket and a pillow), and times when he was left
alone for quiet reflection. He was repeatedly given Miranda warnings, in
Spanish, and indicated each time that he fully understood them.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Chavez's motion to
suppress on this ground.170

While Garcia gives the source of his facts as the "Response to
Defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence,''171 the Florida

169. Garcia, supra note 20, at 500-01 (drawing facts from Response to Defendant's
Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence at 1, State v. Chavez (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1995) (No. 95037867)).
170. Chavez, 832 So. 2d at 749.
171. Garcia, supra note 20, at 499 n.406.

August 2004]

Stories About Miranda

1993

Supreme Court makes only a single indirect reference to the "record"
as the source of its facts: "The trial court's denial of Chavez's motion
to suppress is presumed to be correct and must be upheld where, as
here, that decision is supported by the record."172 Perhaps the motion
to suppress produced evidence more favorable to the State than it
claimed in its response to the motion to suppress, though that does not
seem likely. This might be an example of a court "smoothing out" the
facts to support a decision that it wishes to reach. To affirm a death
sentence by "smoothing out" the facts to the detriment of the
defendant is a pretty sorry business.
But, on either reading of the facts, Chavez shows how police use
Miranda to ward off a claim of coercion. By breaking up the
interrogation and repeatedly giving Miranda warnings, the police
managed to insulate their high-pressure interrogation from scrutiny. I
doubt the Warren Court imagined this use of Miranda. In the "bad old
days" of the voluntariness test, Chavez would have had a better
chance to suppress his confession because the State would not have
had Miranda warnings to inoculate the marathon questioning.173
I have explicitly assumed throughout this paper that the court
opinions accurately recount the facts. The comparison of the Florida
Supreme Court opinion in Chavez with the account Garcia draws from
the State's own court documents calls into question the validity of my
operating assumption. If the appellate courts are "smoothing out" the
facts to permit them to affirm convictions, the incidence of police
coercion and trickery may be substantially more than I found. The
degree of police compliance with Miranda may be substantially lower
than I found. More troubling, if appellate courts are assisting the State
in hiding problems with police interrogation, courts are failing to
provide justice.
6.

Findings on Coercion, Trickery, and Involuntariness

So what is the verdict? Did I uncover sufficient evidence to reject
the earlier findings of little police coercion and trickery in obtaining
waivers or statements? I tentatively conclude that I did not find
enough evidence to reject those findings. But the Chavez case remains
troubling. My finding of little coercion and trickery assumes that
appellate courts in run of the mill cases accurately present facts and
claims relative to suppression. I also assume that when courts resolve
credibility disputes, they resolve them accurately most of the time.

172. Chavez, 832 So. 2d at 748.
173. Professor Garcia agrees, concluding that the police in Chavez used "the great
Miranda warnings to sanitize a clearly involuntary confession." See Garcia, supra note 20,
at 502.
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These are powerful assumptions and I recognize that a reader could
reject them as putting too much faith in appellate court opinions.174
Chavez may be an outlier. Hopefully, cases as gruesome as Chavez
are extremely unusual in the first place. The police did not have much
evidence against Chavez and thus had a powerful incentive to obtain a
statement. Perhaps lack of evidence in murder cases will be unusual in
a world where DNA testing can conclusively prove guilt in many rape
cases. Thus, my assumption that appellate court opinions paint a more
or less accurate picture of the interrogation are, I think, plausible, at
least when limited to the run of the mill case. If these assumptions
hold, my study supports the findings of Leo and of Cassell and
Hayman that there is little police coercion or trickery in typical police
interrogations. Of the twenty-five claims of coercion or trickery,175 I
thought only five presented sufficient credible evidence to qualify as a
violation of the due process voluntariness doctrine: [1] Chavez, of
course; (2) Miller, where I think the court was wrong to deny the claim
of the mentally retarded suspect; [3) Bunting, where the father killed
his son with Freon bubbles; (4) Traylor, where the court applied a
presumption of coercion because of evidence of injury while in police
custody and [5] the case of the eleven-year-old suspect. None of the
other descriptions in the appellate opinions came close to
documenting a due process violation. The reader may quite justifiably
think that the due process voluntariness test is an insufficient
protection of suspects' free will. Indeed, the Miranda Court reached
the same conclusion. But of the suspects who receive warnings, 68%
waive Miranda,176 and the Court has adopted voluntariness as the test
of waiver and of subsequent confessions. Defendants made only five
credible showings of a coerced confession, which is only 2 % of all the
claims where a statement is made (226 cases).
In the actual cases, of course, only Traylor and the juvenile
persuaded a court that the police used coercive tactics. Miller,
Bunting, and Chavez lost. Three other defendants won their claims,
not on the basis of a coerced confession but, rather, on the basis of
what could be termed "technical" violations of Miranda - the failure
to demonstrate that the waiver was voluntary. If we add the technical
Miranda violations to the coerced confession cases, as another way of
showing involuntariness, we have eight credible showings of
involuntariness, broadly conceived, or 3.5% of all the statements.

174. Richard Leo raised this point forcefully. See Leo email, supra note 13. In the
context of Miranda, Richard is both a loyal supporter and a fierce critic of some of my
assumptions about how courts and police approach compliance.
175. See supra Table 6.
176. See supra Table 2.
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Assuming competent lawyering and accurate reporting in court
opinions, and given the tendency of suspect stories to exaggerate
police misconduct, I do not think this frequency is sufficient to cause
us to suspect widespread police misconduct during interrogation.
Richard Leo found a 2% coercion rate in his observational study.177
However accurate my study is in assessing police misconduct, my
account of prosecution stories is a valuable addition to the Miranda
literature. My study provides the first picture of how often prosecutors
rely on various Miranda doctrines as they offer into evidence suspect
statements. I describe these findings in the next Part.
VII. How PROSECUTORS USE THE MIRANDA DOCTRINES
The classification of claims into doctrinal categories in Table 3
shows how prosecutors use the Court's various exceptions to
Miranda.118 When decided, Harris seemed to have blown a gaping hole
in Miranda by permitting use of statements taken in violation of
Miranda to impeach the defendant's credibility, thus indirectly putting
tainted evidence of guilt before the jury. Doctrinally, Harris might be
a disaster. But Table 3 suggests that prosecutors rarely make use of
this way of avoiding Miranda's exclusionary rule - only 1 % of cases
involved an overt use of Harris. Even if we limit the universe to
statements made without warnings,179 Harris accounts for only 3% of
the uses of suspect statements.
To be sure, Harris is useful only when the police have violated
Miranda, and I found only eighteen violations - twelve failures to
warn180 and six refusals to honor an invocation of counsel.181 Perhaps
Harris was not helpful to the State in sixteen of those eighteen cases
because these sixteen defendants chose not to testify, at least in part
because of the Harris threat. It is fair to conclude that Harris is a
minor doctrinal wrinkle. I cannot also conclude that Harris has a
minor real world effect on the decision of whether to testify.
In Oregon v. Elstad,182 the Court held that warnings and a waiver
will, in effect, remedy the harm of a Miranda violation that preceded
the warnings. That exception is of no use to prosecutors seeking to
introduce a statement183 unless the police actually give the warnings
177. Leo, Inside, supra note 15, at 282.
178. See supra Table 3.
179. See supra Table 1.
180. See supra Table 1 .
181. See supra Table 4 .
182. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
183. Prosecutors do not have to show that warnings were given to get physical evidence
admitted under the Elstad exception. When tangible evidence is found as a result of a
Miranda violation, that evidence is admissible even if the statement that led the police to
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after there has been a Miranda violation. Police might do this because
they were unaware that the earlier conversation qualified as custodial
interrogation and thus required warnings - indeed, Elstad's facts
suggest this kind of inadvertent Miranda violation. Or police might
manipulate the Elstad doctrine by intentionally violating Miranda and
then giving the warnings as triage.184 At least in my study, Elstad was
not very significant, providing a remedy for a Miranda violation in
only three cases.185 If the sum total of inadvertent "uses" and
intentional manipulation of Elstad is 3 of 211 cases,186 the hole in
Miranda's protection is insignificant.
New York v. Quarles,187 the public safety case, also precipitated a
good deal of criticism and hand-wringing when it was decided. Even
Justice O'Connor, hardly an ardent supporter of Miranda, dissented
on the ground that the Court was blurring Miranda's relatively clear
strictures without sufficient justification. Whatever blur may have
occurred doctrinally does not seem to have translated into a police
appetite for avoiding Miranda by creative use of the public safety
exception - Table 3 shows that only 2% of the claims were resolved
on this ground.188
But once the police fail to give warnings as required by Miranda,
and prosecutors seek to "save" the confession, Quarles is somewhat
useful. A prosecutor who wants to prove guilt with a statement taken
in violation of Miranda has essentially three arguments from which to
choose: the suspect was not in custody, the police did not interrogate,
or public safety concerns made the warnings unnecessary. In my study,

that evidence is not admissible. The Court suggested as much in Elstad and held that to be
the rule in United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620 (2004). (Though Patane has no majority
opinion, five j ustices agreed that physical evidence is admissible despite being the fruit of a
Miranda violation.)
All the Miranda violations in my sample involved statements. If the prosecutor seeks to
use Elstad to have a statement admitted, the police must give warnings prior to taking the
statement, as I indicate in the text.
Yale Kamisar refuses to let Miranda die (perhaps because of his view of assisted
suicide). He already has a paper forthcoming on the Court's two "fruits" cases decided in
2004
Patane, supra this note, and Missouri v. Seibert, supra note 39. See Yale Kamisar,
Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, The 2004 Miranda "Poisoned Fruit" Cases,
2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
(2004) (forthcoming). The paper is vintage Kamisar, filled with
penetrating analysis, choice quotes from the oral arguments, and provocative hypotheticals
that test the limits of the new doctrine. Kamisar concludes that the new Miranda poisoned
fruit doctrine fails as a reasonable application of Miranda's principles.
-

_

184. The Court just held this strategy unconstitutional. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S.Ct.
2601 (2004) , discussed supra note 39.
185. See supra Table 3.
186. The proper universe is all cases because police could seek to manipulate Elstad in
.
every case.
187. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
188. See supra Table 3.
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police did not give warnings in 60 cases.189 The State obtained
admission of the statement in the case-in-chief in 48 of those cases,190 6
of which were based on the public safety exception. Thus, the public
safety exception explained 13 % of the success in having confessions
admitted despite the lack of warnings. The custody and interrogation
grounds explained the rest
87% . It's clear which argument
prosecutors favor, almost surely because most of the failures to warn
simply cannot be described plausibly as an attempt to protect the
public safety.
Has Miranda had much effect on prosecutors? Table 3 shows that
in 5 % of the cases statements are suppressed for lack of warning; 2 %
of the time when the suspect invoked counsel and the police continued
questioning; and 2% of the time when the defendant successfully
challenges the waiver or subsequent interrogation.191 In seeking
Miranda's real effect, though, we should include the five cases from
Table 3 where the suspect invoked the Miranda right to counsel and
the police ceased questioning.192 If the interrogation had continued, at
least some of those suspects would probably have made a statement. If
we include all, to be conservative, the total negative outcomes, from
the perspective of the State, increases to 1 1 % . Moreover, we should
include some of the suspects who did not answer questions.
Presumably, not all of these suspects were assisted by the warnings we know for a fact that some suspects refused to answer police
questions in the pre-Miranda era - but even if we include all fifteen
of the silent types, we are only up to a negative outcome total of 17% .
Like much else in my study, this finding likely overstates, by a
substantial amount, the loss of statements in the average case that
ends either in a plea bargain or a trial and no appeal. So we can
confidently claim that the effect of Miranda is a lot lower than 1 7 % .
Indeed, w e can speculate that even in the cases that g o t o trial and are
appealed, the true rate of bad outcomes for the State is considerably
less than 17% because not all of the silent types would have answered
questions even if no warnings were given.
-

CONCLUSION
The gaping holes in Miranda's protection that show up in my study
are the ones inherent in Miranda itself. The Court explicitly provided
that the rights could be waived and explicitly limited its warnings
189. See supra Table 1 .
190. Subtract the first two categories from the total o f 60 cases where warnings were not
given. See supra Table 1 .
191. See supra Table 3.
192. Paul Cassell would approve. See Paul G. Cassell; Miranda's Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U . L. REV. 387 (1996).
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requirement to interrogations that take place when the suspect is in
custody.193 Justice Marshall argued in a dissent a few years after
Miranda that custodial interrogation was merely a starting place, and
that the principles underlying Miranda justified the extension of the
doctrine in a more protective direction.194 But the Court never took
that bait. Thus, many police-suspect encounters fall outside Miranda's
ambit. Table 3 shows that 17% of all claims were resolved by holding
that the suspect was either not in custody or not subject to
interrogation. 195 Once we account for suppression, waiver, and various
forms of invocation or silence as shown in Table 3, 235 claims, or 96%,
of the total were resolved within the framework explicitly created by
Miranda. This means only 4 % , or a total of 11 claims, resulted from
the Burger and Rehnquist Court "wrinkles" in the Miranda doctrine
that I was able to test.196
I reiterate that my methodology cannot test the subtle and perhaps
far more pernicious softening of the waiver and invocation rules that
occurred on the watch of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Nor can I
measure the effect of Harris on the defendant's decision to testify
when she faces impeachment by use of a statement taken in violation
of Miranda.
But the main body of my study confirms much of the newly
emerging view of how Miranda operates "on the ground." The original
aspects of my study include trying to uncover the stories defendants
and prosecutors tell when arguing over whether to suppress
statements. Whatever the extent of the methodological flaws in using a
database drawn from Westlaw, the results are in line with Richard
Leo's study and with the Cassell-Hayman study. Police usually give
warnings, they usually do not engage in lengthy or high-pressure
coercion to get waivers, and while they occasionally resort to trickery,
it is rarely of the degree and scope of that suggested in Simon's
book.197 Police do not seem to commit perjury in any kind of obvious
or large-scale way. And even with warnings given properly and police
more or less observant of the rules about waiver, police are hugely
successful in getting suspects to say incriminating things.
Suspects usually waive their rights and talk to the police, and
defendants almost always lose their motions to suppress statements.

193. Once again, Yale Kamisar has written early and with great insight on these issues.
See, e.g. , Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"?
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978).
194. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 497-99 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195. See supra Table 3.
196. Six cases admitted statements because of Quarles, three because of Elstad, and two
because of Harris. See supra Table 3.
197. See SIMON, supra note 22, at 197-203.
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Many suspects talk, not because police are skilled or calculating, but
because at some level they want to talk to police. They want to tell
their story because they think they can skillfully navigate the shoals of
police interrogation and arrive safely on the other shore. If this is the
right way to view most (not all) suspects, then the Court has for many
decades had the wrong "picture" of police interrogation. In the 1940s,
the Court seemed to view suspects as coolly calculating actors who
confessed to gain some tactical advantage.198 Miranda, on the other
hand, viewed suspects as either helpless or confused, incapable of
making a rational choice about answering police questions.199 My data,
and the emerging idea of a guilty suspect who talks in the hope that he
can persuade the police to release him, paint a different picture. The
guilty suspects who waive Miranda and answer police questions look
neither calculating, nor helpless. Instead they appear to be willing but
overmatched participants in the game of interrogation.
My study is the latest piece of evidence that Miranda has not
changed very much about police interrogation. Perhaps history will
record the Miranda revolution as a mere blip on the screen in the
centuries of evolving law that regulates police questioning of
suspects.200 But there is no denying the enduring power of the insight
Yale Kamisar had almost forty years ago.201 American society values
informed citizens and equal treatment. Our Constitution gives
suspects the right not to answer police questions. To inform all
suspects who face police interrogators of this right is simply part and
parcel of what America means. That the Supreme Court in 2000
reaffirmed Miranda, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist,202 is a fitting tribute to Yale Kamisar's vision and skill.
The larger implication of my study is a cautionary note for law
reformers who think that law can change behavior in ways that suit the
198. See, e.g. , Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). The Court noted that the
suspect, who likely murdered two wives,
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his questioning, and at his
trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost his freedom of action that the statements
were not his but were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer.
Id.
199. Many examples can be given. See, e.g. , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458
(1966) (noting that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice").
+

200. For a doctrinal argument along these lines, see George C. Thomas Ill, The End of
the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and Future of Rules for Police
Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2000).
201. See Kamisar, Equal Justice, supra note 6, at 19.
202. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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reformers. Law can change behavior, to be sure, but only when it
changes the balance of incentives and thus makes the actor choose a
different course because she perceives it to be better than any other
course. As long as suspects think they are better off trying to persuade
police that they are not guilty, they will continue to talk to police.
Miranda provides knowledge that it might not be in a suspect's best
interests to talk to police. But this knowledge is meaningless as long as
suspects are willing to take the chance that it is in their best interests
to talk. As that calculation is based on a suspect's entire life telling
stories, the Miranda Court was naive if it thought that a set of formal
warnings could change story-telling behavior. My study suggests that
the warnings do not change suspect behavior in any significant way.

